

**30 AUGUST: THE VICTORY OF MİND, PERSEVERENCE AND COURAGE
(30 AĞUSTOS: AKLIN, AZMİN VE CESARETİN ZAFERİ)****Orhan GÖKTEPE**

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Özet

30 Ağustos zaferi hiç şüphesiz Türk tarihinin en önemli dönüm noktalarından biridir. Bu zaferle sadece Yunan işgal güçleri Anadolu'dan kovulmakla kalmamış aynı zamanda bağımsız ve modern Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin kurulmasına zemin hazırlanmıştır. Hiç şüphesiz büyük bir askeri deha olan Mustafa Kemal'in başkomutan olarak bu taarruzun başarısında çok büyük etkisi vardır. Vatanın kurtuluşu için yoksul Anadolu halkının canını dişine takarak seferber ettiği bu ordunun kesin bir zafer elde etmesinin haricinde bir başka seçenek yoktu. Tüm kaynakları tükenme noktasına gelen Türk milletinin bu mücadeleyi daha fazla sürdürme imkânı kalmamıştı. Canını dişine takarak, son bir gayretle zafere ulaşılması şarttı. Ancak zafere giden yolun üzerinde tek engel Yunan işgal güçleri değildi. İtilaf devletleri ile işbirliği içinde olan padişah ve hilafet yanlılarının düşmanlıkları, TBMM içinde muhalif milletvekillerinin engellemeleri ve dış siyasi baskılar da zaman zaman milli mücadeleyi yok olma tehlikesi ile karşı karşıya bırakmaktaydı. Bu makalede 30 Ağustos zaferinin askeri yönlerinden ziyade, kurtuluş savaşının ve Türk'ün bağımsızlık sembolü haline gelen Mustafa Kemal'i yıpratmak ve başarıdan alıkoymak için yürütülen girişimler ele alınacaktır. Bu zorluklar karşısında, onun sadece askeri dehası değil üstün bir lider, öngörüsü yüksek bir siyasetçi ve devlet adamı olarak hayranlık uyandıran vasıfları bir kez daha ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mustafa KEMAL, 30 Ağustos 1922, Zafer Günü, Dumlupınar Başkomutanlık Meydan Muharebesi, Kurtuluş Savaşı

Abstract:

The victory of 30 August is undoubtedly one of the most important turning points in Turkish history. With this victory, not only the Greek occupation forces were expelled from Anatolia, but also were laid the groundwork for the establishment of an independent and modern Turkish Republic. Undoubtedly, Mustafa Kemal, who is a military genius, had a great role in the success of this attack as the commander-in-chief. This army, which mobilized by the poor Anatolian people using everything they had for the salvation of the homeland, had no other option to achieve a decisive Turkish victory. Having come to the point of exhaustion of all its resources, the Turkish nation had no opportunity to continue this struggle any longer. An absolute victory had to be achieved with a final counterattack. However, the Greek occupation forces were not the only obstacle on the way to victory. Besides that the hostilities of the sultan and the Istanbul government, and obstructions of the opponents in the parliament also threatened the national liberation struggle. In this article, rather than the military aspects of the 30 August victory, the attempts to wear down and prevent Mustafa Kemal from success, who has become the symbol of the Turkish War of Independence and the Turkish independence

struggle, will be reviewed. In the face of these difficulties, not only his military skills, but also his admirable qualities as a superior leader, a visionary politician and a statesman will emerge.

Keywords: Mustafa KEMAL, 30 August 1922, The victory day, The pitched battle of the commander-in-chief at Dumlupinar, The salvation war

1. INTRODUCTION

The ambitions of the imperialist states to break up the Ottoman Empire and to eradicate the Turks from the stage of history were interrupted by the 30 August victory of the Turkish Army. Finally the Ottoman Empire collapsed, however they could not achieve to expel Turks from Anatolia, on the contrary a powerful and modern Turkish Republic was born with this victory. The country had exhausted in the wars that continued for more than 10 years since the Balkan war, the young male population, the main power of production, had been crushed by wars, and the Turkish people had been devastated by poverty and disease.

After the Treaty of Sèvres signed between the Ottoman Empire, which was among the defeated states as a result of the First World War, and the Allied Powers, some parts of the Anatolia were occupied by the military forces of England, France, Italy, Greece. The last Ottoman ruler, Sultan Vahdettin and his government preferred cooperation and partnership with the occupation forces in complete surrender rather than fighting. Under these conditions, Mustafa Kemal and his friends, started the national struggle and succeeded in convening the National Assembly in Ankara, had taken the fate of the country and the nation in their hands. (Aydemir, 2009:144).

Grand National Assembly, opened on April 23, 1920, consisted of all social layers and different political and ideological groups (Güneş, 1997:130). There were 324 deputies in the first parliament, some of them were from the Ottoman Meclis-i Mebusan dispersed in Istanbul, and others were the members of Anadolu and Rumelia Müdafa-ı Hukuk. Contrary to expectations, the first assembly was not clamped together around Mustafa Kemal during the national salvation struggle. Although there were no political parties in the first parliament, different interest groups had their own political agenda. Among them, the "independence group" consisting of deputies of pro-Mustafa Kemal and the progressive intellectuals; the group of "green army" advocating Islamic Socialism; the supporters of Bolshevism; the supporters of the former "Committee of Union and Progress"; in addition to the sultan and the supporters of the caliphate and religious extremists, there were some deputies who had enmity and personal jealousy towards Mustafa Kemal (Güneş, 1997:151). Due to the conflicts of interest among these groups, it had become difficult to pass the necessary laws for the liberation struggle from the parliament. In such a dispersed political spectrum in the parliament which left it vulnerable against external influences easily, the necessary national unity for the liberation struggle was achieved thanks to the superior leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

While the Kuvayi Milliye forces were fighting the Armenians in the East, the Greek occupation army in the West, and the French and Italian forces in the South, they also had to struggle with many internal rebellions that were started by provocations of the Istanbul Government and the support of the British Government.

The Greek army, which moved forward to seize Ankara, the center of the liberation struggle by eradicating the Turkish army and to disband the parliament, was defeated at the

battle of Sakarya. After this defeat, the Greeks occupation army went on the defensive behind the Eskişehir-Afyon line (Coşkun, 2018:491). This success had raised the Turkish people's hopes for salvation, and had created the determination to drive the enemy out of Anatolia with a last effort. However, the Turkish army, which was strengthened by mobilizing of all properties of the people in poverty, could have been used only once. Because the nation did not have the strength to continue this struggle more. Any failure in this attack would have meant the destruction of both the national struggle in Ankara and all of the Anatolia. Accepting the post of commander-in-chief in such a critical situation, Mustafa Kemal assumed the fate of the country and all responsibility.

However, the dissident deputies who disdained the country's liberation struggle and were suspicious of the success of the Turkish army were trying to wear down and prevent Mustafa Kemal in the parliament. This increasing opposition in the national parliament right before the great Turkish attack, was only serving the purposes of occupation forces, the Ottoman Sultan, the religious bigots and the ethnic separatists.

The Battle of the Commander-in-Chief on August 30 was undoubtedly the greatest military victory with its preparation, planning and execution. However in this article, rather than the military aspect of this admirable success, the internal and external pressures and plots faced by Mustafa Kemal who took all responsibility as the commander-in-chief of the Turkish army are covered. In fact, the main goal of this hostility was to destroy the liberation struggle in the person of Mustafa Kemal and the resistance of the Turkish people. These hostile attempts at home were so critical and effective that if they were successful, Turkish liberation struggle could have doomed unsuccessful at the early beginning. As it is seen that the great attack of the Turkish Army is not only a magnificent military success in the liberation of the country but also the victory of mind, will, and perseverance against the domestic and foreign political intrigues and obstacles.

2. THE PRESSURES ON MUSTAFA KEMAL FOR A HASTY AND AN UNPREPARED ATTACK IN THE PARLIAMENT

At the end of the Battle of Sakarya, which continued for 22 days and nights, it was understood that the Greek occupation forces could not defeat the Turkish army and capture Ankara (Yılmaz, 1998:311). However, it seemed possible for the Greek army to keep their gains by defending the places they had occupied up to that point. The allied powers had considered that the Turkish army was not strong enough to push back the Greek defense lines. Besides, in order to consolidate their gains, it had been planning to establish an independent and autonomous state, named "Ionia" in the occupied region (Coşkun, 2018:542). For this aim, an attempt was started with voluntary organizations from Europe and Greece. On the other side, the Sultan and the Istanbul government were trying to break up the liberation struggle in Ankara with all their might.

Meanwhile, with the initiatives of England, France and Italy, they offered Ankara a ceasefire and peace talk. However, this peace proposal was a deception, did not bring any improvement in the current situations in favor of the Ankara Government, rather it had aimed to leave the Turkish army into the inaction position. This peace proposal, made by the Allied Powers with the cooperation of the Istanbul government, aimed to end the national struggle

through the opposition group in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Upon these peace moves, the dissident deputies in the Turkish Grand National Assembly increased their pressure on the Ankara Government to make a peace as soon as possible. In the criticisms of the opposition, it had been emphasizing that the country was tired of fighting for years and the national army could not do anything but retreat. Mustafa Kemal was throwing the sons of the country on adventures in vain. In order to show he was also a pro-peace, Mustafa Kemal did not reject the allied peace proposal immediately but he made some counteroffers as a response to their peace move so that the critics against him on the National Assembly were appeased. In the offer; Mustafa Kemal stated that they were ready for peace talks on the condition that the Greek army must evacuate the all areas they occupied within 4 months. The Allied states did not respond to this wisely prepared peace move of Ankara. This counter move gave Mustafa Kemal an opportunity to say, "We made every effort for peace, but as you can see, the Allied states did not want a fair and reasonable peace agreement actually" (Atatürk, 2004:438-442).

The Battle of Sakarya was won, but the Turkish army was also quite worn out and tired. The army had to be prepared for launching a great counterattack. In October 1921, a delegation of deputies made a troop visit at the front line and presented their findings on the situation of the army in a report to the parliament. In the report; it was stated that most of the soldiers were barefoot and they still wore their own civilian clothes rather than uniforms. Because there was not enough uniform at the hand of the army to dress them in. As it was observed that the soldiers were not having a meal regularly and well enough, and officers did not receive a salary for 3-4 months. Since there was not enough money to buy food for the Army in the national budget, they were trying to procure food supply from the market with debt. In the recommendations section of the report; 150.000 clothes were requested to be provided before winter. It was emphasized that 50.000 clothes were urgently needed for the soldiers, and a topcoat, a pair of socks and a pair of boots were needed for the others (Mütercimler, 2016:440). In addition, the army was in great deficiencies in terms of weapons and ammunition.

While the preparations of the Turkish Army has been continuing, a group in the parliament was increasing their pressures on Mustafa Kemal for an attack against the Greek army at once. Undoubtedly, such a hasty attack with insufficient preparation would have resulted in disaster for the Turkish Army and all hopes of the salvation would be destroyed. This defeat also meant the end of Mustafa Kemal, who assumed all political and military responsibility. That was exactly what the allied states, the sultan and the supporters of the caliphate wanted. However, as a result of his persuasive statements and efforts in the parliament, Mustafa Kemal succeeded in resisting these pressures and did not jeopardize the success of the attack. All the efforts in the parliament made masterly by Mustafa Kemal not only failed these kind of malicious attempts, but also raised the hopes of success in the nation.

3. ATTEMPTS IN PARLIAMENT FOR ENDING THE AUTHORITY OF MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA AS THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

As a result of heated debates in the parliament about the situation of the Turkish army that retreated until the Sakarya, Mustafa Kemal was asked to take responsibility as the commander-in-chief. However, it was clear that the deputies in the parliament had different aims in supporting this general proposal. The aim of this group was to put the full responsibility

of a possible defeat on the commander-in-chief Mustafa Kemal and to accuse him of all the bad results, if happened. The others deputies in the parliament who were more sincere and honest wanted Mustafa Kemal to be appointed to this post because they had trusted him and his military genius for the salvation of the country. Mustafa Kemal accepted this mission on condition that he could use the power of the parliament in order to carry out such a vital task in the most effective way. However Mustafa Kemal, as his respect to sovereignty of the parliament, had demanded that this authority would be limited to quarterly periods. After debates at the general assembly, the mission of Commander-in-Chief was given to Mustafa Kemal on 5th August 1921 with the authority that he could use power of the parliament (Coşkun, 2018:436). With this special authority, Mustafa Kemal achieved a great improvement in the equipment and supply of the army by the orders of "national obligation" (Tekalif-i Milliye). However, this authority became null, as sufficient approval votes could not be obtained at the third extension meeting on May 5, 1922. Since the number of resolutions could not be obtained, the law had to be re-voted in parliament the next day. This obstruction, carried out by the opposition deputies in the parliament just before three months the great Turkish attack, was directly targeting Mustafa Kemal and the success of the Turkish army. Under the roof of parliament such a hostile attitude towards the national struggle made the top leaders of the army extremely sad and caused disappointment.

As a reaction to the dissenters' move in the parliament, the Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Çakmak Pasha and the Minister of National Defense Kazım Özalp Pasha, conveyed their intention of resignation to Mustafa Kemal (Sarıhan, 1994:442). In order to prevent such a crisis, which could jeopardize the success of the grand attack, Mustafa Kemal asked them to be a little more patient and wait. The next day, Mustafa Kemal made important statements to the deputies before the voting again for the extension of the Commander in Chief's authority in the parliament. In his speech, Mustafa Kemal responded to the criticism that powers of the parliament were seized through the law of the Commander-in-Chief as follows: "you gave me the post of Commander-in-Chief. I never asked anyone to make me the Commander-in-Chief. The powers delegated to me are limited to the military affairs only. Before anything else, this parliament is my work and my task is to raise the value of this work, not to reduce" (Coşkun, 2018:525). Mustafa Kemal Pasha emphasized that if this extension law for the special authority of Commander in Chief would not accepted, the Chief of the General Staff and the council of ministers would resigned therefore the general administration of the country could be seriously at risk. In the new voting, the parliament adopted extension of the law with a majority. It was clear that these attempts in the parliament to wear down Mustafa Kemal and the national government stemmed from attempts of the occupation states and the Istanbul government.

When the preparations of Turkish Army came to the final stage for the grand attack, on 20 July 1922, Mustafa Kemal made a speech in the parliament that surprised everyone. His speech in the parliament, Mustafa Kemal stated that the physical and moral preparations of the army were completed therefore as the Commander-in-Chief, he did not need to use that special authority any longer and he demanded abolishment of this law. Upon this impressive speech, the Parliament decided unanimously to extend the Commander-in-Chief law indefinitely (Cebesoy, 2002:81).

Threats against the national struggle did not originate only from the occupying forces at the front. Internal attempts to disrupt the national salvation war had been causing greater difficulty more than occupation forces. To overcome such challenges required not only military skills but also superior leadership abilities, and psychological resilience as well. Mustafa Kemal had more than all of these features.

4. LAW AMENDMENT MADE ON THE FORMATION OF THE PARLIAMENT GOVERNMENT

When the national parliament was first opened in 1920 Ankara, the "Government of the Grand National Assembly" system was adopted as the government model. There were no political parties in the first parliament. Undoubtedly, all deputies had their own world-views, but the common point of all was liberation of the country, within the borders of *misak-ı milli*, from enemy occupation as soon as possible. In the parliamentary government system; ministers were elected by the deputies and they were directly responsible to the assembly. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey had been deciding to choose one of the three candidates for each ministry that was proposed by the president of the assembly. The Council of Ministers had been choosing one of its own members as "vice-president". The president of the assembly had also been presiding over the council of ministers. Thus, Mustafa Kemal as the president of the parliament, was working in harmony with the council of ministers.

Less than two months before the grand attack, opposition deputies proposed the election of ministers directly by members of the parliament with secret ballot rather than from nominees proposed by the president of parliament. Under the influence of the opposition group, the possibility of working with some ministers who were against the spirit of the *Kuvayi Milliye* policy had made Mustafa Kemal uneasy. The bill of law was discussed in the assembly and accepted on 8 July 1922. Thereupon, the council of ministers submitted their resignations to the parliament. General Fevzi Çakmak resigned from his position as the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chief of General Staff (Özalp, 1998:423). Mustafa Kemal interpreted this law as a loss of parliamentary confidence towards him in the assembly and as a show of power by the opposition deputies. Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to İsmet İNÖNÜ and Kazım KARABEKİR on July 10, 1922, informing them that he was considering resigning from his duties as president of the parliament and the Commander-in-Chief. There was a very serious situation. In his reply, İsmet İNÖNÜ advised Mustafa Kemal to act with restraint and to wait for the parliament to elect a new government and to take a stand accordingly (Karabekir, 2008:1269-1272). 47 days before the great attack, the new amendment for the appointment of the new council of ministers by the parliament was a very critical period in the history of the national struggle. Although there was absolutely no reason and no need to make such an amendment the main purpose of this law was to erode the Mustafa Kemal's leadership and to disrupt the national unity in the salvation struggle by forming a new council of ministers consisting of the opposition deputies. However, thanks to the common sense of the majority deputies and their trust in Mustafa Kemal, the opposition group could not reach its goal. No important change happened, the parliament appointed Rauf ORBAY as the new prime minister. Kazım ÖZALP for the Ministry of National Defense and Fevzi ÇAKMAK for the Chief of General Staff were re-elected. The new Council of Ministers consisted of the deputies who

were in line with the spirit of national struggle and able to work with Mustafa Kemal in harmony. However, the remarkable point was that as getting closer to the main goal in the national struggle, opposition in the parliament was increasing more.

5. ACQUISITION OF THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE THRACE

By the 30 August victory, the Greek Army was defeated and İzmir was liberated from the enemy occupation, but Eskişehir and Bursa were still under control of the Greek Army. Edirne and Thrace were also in the hands of Greek Army. Istanbul and the Turkish Straits were under the control of British, French and Italian forces. With the enthusiasm created by the victory in İzmir, excessive demands began to rise in the parliament for liberation of the Thrace and Istanbul as soon as possible. However, the Turkish army was very tired and serious problems had arisen in support of ammunition and logistics. On the other side, the allied powers, who were extremely strong in terms of vehicles, equipment, ammunition, air and naval fleet, had a military force of 65,000 soldiers, including 31,000 British, in the Turkish straits. Mustafa Kemal exhibited extremely balanced policy against these demands. He was well aware that a careless and hasty move would destroy all gains at hand so far. "We will march on Çanakkale, but not to wage war, but to force the allies and especially the British to a ceasefire. If the British are willing to fight, let them open the first fire. Then we will fight," he said (Özakman, 2005:670). A day after the liberation of Izmir, on 10 September 1922, British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon called on the government of French and Italian to be ready to defend the Turkish straits against a possible Turkish attack. Lord Curzon informed the British high representative in Istanbul that he was against the withdrawal of the Greeks in Thrace, and the Dardanelles and Thrace would be defended by English forces if necessary (Şimşir, 1992:391). In addition, the British Ministry of War had instructed General Harrington, the military commander in Istanbul, to prevent Turkish forces from crossing into Thrace from Anatolia (Walder, 2004:218).

However, at this delicate stage, Mustafa Kemal succeeded in getting the national demands by his decisive diplomatic skills without entering into the direct conflict with the British forces. Mustafa Kemal told the Chicago Tribune on September 13, 1922, that the Turks insisted on having the "misak-ı milli" national borders they had demanded from the very beginning of the liberation struggle (Atatürk, 2003:281). In the meantime, the Turkish troops in the north of Eskişehir began the forward operation and liberated Eskişehir and Bursa from the enemy occupation. On September 15, the British government instructed its forces to prevent the Turkish army advancing in the direction of Balıkesir and Edremit from crossing into Thrace via Çanakkale and sent a British warship to Gallipoli. Britain was putting pressure on France and Italy for fighting especially to prevent the Turkish straits from getting out of their control. But the French public opinion was against a new war. Despite the British pressure, the French forces began to withdraw from their positions in Çanakkale and Izmit peninsula as of September 18. Italian forces also participated in this withdrawal. Upon these developments, British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon went to Paris on 19 September and started negotiations with France and Italy. While these negotiations were continuing in Paris, the French High Commissioner General Pelle visited Mustafa Kemal in Izmir. General Pelle requested Mustafa Kemal that Turkish troops not enter the neutral zone until the peace talks in Paris were

concluded. Mustafa Kemal replied that they did not recognize such a neutral zone and a victorious army could not be curbed for long. From this meeting with General Pelle, Mustafa Kemal noticed that there was a discrepancy of opinion between the United Kingdom and France, furthermore France had no intention of engaging in a conflict with the Turks in Çanakkale and Thrace. Taking this into account, Mustafa Kemal ordered the troops to advance in the direction of Çanakkale on 19 September. Taking this into account, Mustafa Kemal ordered the troops to advance in the direction of Çanakkale on 19 September. However, he ordered that while advancing through the British line of defence Turkish soldiers must carry their rifles' muzzle facing the ground in order to show them they did not have any hostile attitude. In the face of non-hostile advancement of Turkish troops, the British soldiers hesitated and did not open fire, thus the Turkish troops passed through the British positions without facing any resistance (Glasneck, 2014:134). By applying an unprecedented war tactic, Mustafa Kemal had forced the enemy to act according to his own will (Meydan, 2017:510). While the negotiations were continuing in Paris, Soviet Russia gave a note to the allied states and stated that they would not accept a *fait accompli* regarding Turkey and the Straits. Undoubtedly, this attitude of Soviet Russia had strengthened Mustafa Kemal's hand.

When Mustafa Kemal was dealing with all these complex diplomatic developments in Izmir, he received a surprising telegram from Ankara. In the message, it was stated that the military operation had ended successfully and his duty as the commander-in-chief was completed, and implying that the next affairs belonged to the council of ministers, he was invited to Ankara. This telegram, prepared with the guidance of the opposition deputies in the Assembly meant the elimination of Mustafa Kemal, who ensured the liberation struggle was carried out in military and political unity. Of course, such a situation not only could have jeopardize all efforts made so far but it could have ruined all hopes. Mustafa Kemal could never accept such an invitation and could not have stepped aside. His reply to the telegram, he recommended that ministers who wanted to meet him should come to Izmir to get his instruction. Thereupon, Prime Minister Rauf Orbay and Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal came to Izmir to meet with Mustafa Kemal on September 21, 1922 (Atatürk, 2004:461).

On September 28, 1922, the French statesman Franklin Bouillon was received by Mustafa Kemal in Izmir. Bouillon stated that negotiations in Paris yielded positive results in line with the demands of the Ankara government and he submitted the ceasefire proposal prepared by the Allies to Mustafa Kemal. In the allied note; all Greek troops would withdraw from Edirne and Thrace, but a buffer zone in that evacuated area would be created and an international control system would be established in the Turkish Straits. In his reply to the note, Mustafa Kemal demanded that Thrace be evacuated from the Greek army as soon as possible and declared that Ankara would participate at the ceasefire meeting in Mudanya (Atatürk, 2004:460). Despite all the obstacles, Mustafa Kemal achieved all his attainable goals in a peaceful manner without risking the victory with his superior qualifications not only in the military field but also in the diplomatic area.

6. CONCLUSION

The Dumlupınar operation, carried out by Mustafa Kemal as a great military genius, was recorded in the history of war as a unique victory. Against the Greek occupation forces which

were superior in numbers and weapons than Turkish forces, the unexpected siege operation from the south of the well prepared and strong Greek defense lines, brought an unprecedented victory to Turks and the Greek Army were completely destroyed (Görgülü, 1992:s.4-5).

Despite extremely limited and poor economic situation, the successful logistic support of this great Turkish attack which allowed the liberation of the country is another miracle. This altruistic logistical support, which was achieved by mobilizing all the potential of the Turkish people, was thanks to the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

Mustafa Kemal with his political skill successfully developed good political relations with France, Italy and the Soviet Russia by this way he created the more favorable foreign conditions in struggle against England. After the liberation of Izmir, the evacuation of Marmara and Thrace without a hot conflict with the British and French forces and without a single shot being fired was the most glorious success of Mustafa Kemal's strategic genius.

The betrayal and hostilities at home which were carried out against Mustafa Kemal in the national liberation constituted the less known but more difficult part of the struggle. In the liberation struggle, these attempts to divide the national unity were much more difficult and more abrasive than the military and political struggle against the occupiers. While fighting with the enemy, the attempts of the supporter of the Istanbul Government, pro-caliphate reactionaries and former the Committee of Union and Progress activists to undermine the Turkish liberation struggle in the person of Mustafa Kemal were the exemplary events happened in the national parliament. As many Turkish and foreign historians accepted that despite all hostilities at home and abroad, the victory of the liberation struggle in Anatolia was realized with the superior leadership skills of Mustafa Kemal.

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